Hormuz ceasefire collapses, strait closed a fourth time: July 2026 freight and rerouting

Hormuz Ceasefire Collapses, Strait Closed a Fourth Time: July 2026 Freight, Insurance & Rerouting Guide

By Qingdao Mighty International Freight Forwarding

From "bumpy reopening" to "ceasefire collapse": mid-to-late July Hormuz situation, rates, and the exporter playbook

【July 21 update · Ceasefire collapses, strait closed a fourth time, US blockade back】The "bumpy reopening" that followed the June 17 Islamabad Memorandum reversed completely in early July. On July 6–7, the Qatari LNG tanker Al Rekayyat (engine-room fire, crew evacuated), the Saudi supertanker Wedyan, and the Liberian-flagged Cyprus Prosperity were attacked in succession; the US Treasury reimposed oil sanctions on Iran and CENTCOM resumed airstrikes. On July 8, the US-Iran interim truce formally collapsed (Trump said the ceasefire was "over"). On July 12, the IRGC Navy declared the strait closed for a fourth time; the Cyprus-flagged container ship GFS Galaxy was struck and abandoned (one Indian crew member died). Early on July 14, Iranian cruise missiles hit three tankers (1 dead, 8 injured, 3 missing), and the US reinstated its naval blockade the same day — followed by ten consecutive nights of strikes on Iranian military targets. On July 20, the Dynacom tanker Kavomaleas was attacked and abandoned inside the US-coordinated southern corridor off Oman, the Kuwaiti KOTC tanker Kaifan was hit the same day, and Yemen's Houthis declared a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, escalating Bab el-Mandeb risk in parallel. In the week through July 20, strait transits collapsed 66% week-on-week (157 → 53, Lloyd's List Intelligence) — roughly 15% of pre-war levels; 59 merchant ships have been attacked and 17 seafarers killed since the war began (IMO). War-risk premiums are rising again with some underwriters advising owners to pause voyages, and Middle East container rates have passed their pandemic peak. The "July 15 watch window" from our July 1 playbook is closed: price all August–September sailings on diversion plus full war-risk cover — do not wait for the strait to recover.

【July 1 update · The "bumpy reopening" after the MoU (now superseded by the ceasefire collapse)】On June 17, Trump and Iranian President Pezeshkian signed the "Islamabad Memorandum" ending the war and lifting blockades on the strait; on June 19, Trump announced a renewed Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire brokered by the US, Qatar, and Iran. But implementation has not been smooth: Israel kept striking southern Lebanon (at least 12 strikes on June 19, per Al Jazeera), and on June 20 Iran announced it was closing the strait again, citing Israel's actions as a violation of the agreement (the US military denied Iran's claim). On June 25, the Singaporean-flagged container ship Ever Lovely was attacked southeast of Dahit, Oman, forcing the IMO to pause a plan to evacuate 11,000 stranded seafarers. On June 27, the oil tanker Kiku was struck in the strait by an Iranian attack drone, damaging its bridge; US Central Command then conducted airstrikes against Iranian military and communications sites near the strait. Also on June 27, the US Navy-led Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) announced a widened transit corridor near Oman, allowing increased naval escort transits. On July 1, a US Navy Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk helicopter assigned to the USS George H. W. Bush made an emergency landing in the Arabian Sea; one aviator was reported missing (the US military said there was no indication of hostile activity).

【June 17 MoU signing · June 19 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire】Per The Hindu and TRT World, on June 17 Trump and Pezeshkian signed the "Islamabad Memorandum" — Iran committed to "instantly" reopen Hormuz, and the US committed to "immediately" lift its naval blockade of Iran. On June 19, Trump announced an Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire starting Friday, brokered by the US, Qatar, and Iran (Reuters). Market sentiment was briefly optimistic, with oil prices dropping about 11% on the day of the June 17 announcement.

【June 11 closure and strikes · background】In the early hours of June 11 local time, Iran's Armed Forces Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters announced the Strait of Hormuz is closed to all vessels effective immediately, and struck US ships in the strait; multiple explosions were reported in southern Iran (Minab, Sirik, Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, Hengam Island). WTI crude rose 3.79% to $93.44/barrel. The June 15 peace-agreement text, the June 17 MoU signing, and Iran's June 20 re-closure over continued Israeli strikes on Lebanon, mean the "signed-then-closed-again" whipsaw is the core variable exporters must price and schedule around for July.

Editor's note (original June 3): On June 1, 2026, Iran's negotiating team announced it would suspend dialogue and the exchange of texts with the United States through intermediaries, stating that "the resistance front and Iran have resolved to completely block the Strait of Hormuz and activate other fronts including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait." For exporters, the real risk is this — if Hormuz (about 20% of global seaborne oil) and Bab el-Mandeb (about 12%, the Red Sea–Suez gateway on the Asia-Europe mainline) are disrupted simultaneously, it amounts to a "dual chokepoint," and even the Cape of Good Hope fallback gets more congested and more expensive. This article consolidates the latest public information from CNBC, Drewry WCI, Freightos, Lloyd's List, gCaptain, UKMTO, JMIC, Splash247, Wikipedia and others, focusing on rates, surcharges, war-risk insurance, and rerouting — with a July playbook and August scenarios for traders.

1. Latest situation timeline (ongoing updates)

【July 21, 2026 update】Ceasefire collapse, fourth closure, and the return of the US blockade: full record of July 6–21

From early July, the "bumpy reopening" that followed the June 17 MoU was terminated by a chain of vessel attacks and retaliation. The US-Iran interim truce collapsed on July 8, Iran declared the strait closed a fourth time on July 12, and the US reinstated its naval blockade on July 14 — three milestones that put the situation back on the February–April confrontation track, with attacks now explicitly extending to merchant ships inside the US-coordinated southern corridor off Oman.

  • July 20–21 · Two ships hit in the southern corridor the same day; Houthis declare Saudi blockade: The Malta-flagged tanker Kavomaleas, managed by Greece's Dynacom, was struck by two projectiles about 8 nm northwest of Kumzar, Oman — inside the US-coordinated southern route — triggering an engine-room fire and full crew abandonment (gCaptain/UKMTO); the Kuwaiti KOTC tanker Kaifan broadcast a distress call the same day after being hit by a drone or missile. CENTCOM completed its tenth consecutive night of strikes on Iranian military targets. Also on July 20, Yemen's Houthis declared an "effective immediately" naval blockade on Saudi Arabia — a full Bab el-Mandeb closure would halt Saudi Red Sea crude exports to Asia and cut global oil supply by a further ~7% (the war has already cut global flows ~10%, Reuters).
  • July 17–19 · Transits hit rock bottom: S&P Global recorded just 40 transits over July 17–19 (~13/day), with weekly traffic through July 19 down almost 50% week-on-week; only about one-third of transiting vessels were assessed as compliant, with Iran-linked and sanctioned ships dominating as mainstream owners stay away (CNBC). USNI: the US Navy disabled a violating vessel a day into the blockade as risk appetite collapsed. MST Marquee: Hormuz flows are ~15% of pre-war levels, and oil could retest $100/barrel if fighting persists for weeks (Goldman Sachs has also revived its $100 forecast).
  • July 15–16 · Some owners refuse US-escorted transits: Reuters reported that after the run of attacks, some shipowners are refusing US-military-guided transits; Vortexa analysts note that Iran is now specifically striking vessels using the Omani route, pushing ships toward the Iranian route or "dark" AIS-off transits. Iran warned the US not to cross its "red line" (CNBC).
  • July 14 · Iran hits three tankers pre-dawn (1 dead, 8 injured, 3 missing); US reinstates blockade: The Norwegian chemical tanker Stolt Magnesium was hit northeast of Qalhat; the UAE-owned tankers Mombasa B and Al Bahyah were struck by cruise missiles — one Indian crew member died aboard Mombasa B, eight were injured (six Indians, two Ukrainians), and three crew from Al Bahyah are missing; all three ships were disabled and evacuated. The IRGC claimed it struck "offending supertankers" entering a "mined route." The US reinstated its naval blockade the same day (confirmed by CENTCOM July 15); the UN condemned the attacks, saying the "cycle of escalation must end." Trump the same day scrapped his proposed Hormuz transit fee in exchange for Gulf states' investment deals (the plan had been estimated by the New York Times to potentially double shipping costs, and the IMO had publicly opposed it).
  • July 12 · Iran declares strait closed a fourth time; GFS Galaxy struck and abandoned: The IRGC Navy declared the strait closed after firing warning shots at a ship on an "unauthorized route"; the Cyprus-flagged container ship GFS Galaxy suffered heavy engine-room damage, its crew — including 11 Indian nationals — abandoned ship, with 10 rescued and one missing (his body was recovered by the Omani Navy on July 14). US forces struck Iranian missile batteries, air-defense systems, and IRGC fast-attack boats, including targets on Qeshm Island; Iranian media reported a navy lieutenant killed at the port of Jask.
  • July 8 · US-Iran interim truce collapses: After Iran's run of ship attacks, Trump said the ceasefire was "over" (per Wikipedia's crisis entry, the interim truce agreement broke down July 8); on July 9, US strikes extended to Tehran for the first time, and Iran fired missiles and drones at multiple Gulf states (Al Jazeera). Japan evacuated 22 Japan-linked vessels from the Gulf over July 7–9, leaving only four (Japan's transport ministry).
  • July 6–7 · Three ships attacked; US reimposes sanctions: The Qatari LNG tanker Al Rekayyat was struck off Oman, suffering an engine-room fire that risked explosion, with the crew evacuated (Qatar accused Iran); the Saudi supertanker Wedyan and the Liberian-flagged Cyprus Prosperity were hit in quick succession. The US Treasury reimposed the oil-export sanctions lifted under the Islamabad Memorandum, and CENTCOM announced a new wave of strikes on Iranian military sites near the strait; four oil and gas tankers turned back (Reuters).

Note: Compiled from gCaptain, UKMTO, CENTCOM statements, Reuters, CNBC, Al Jazeera, USNI News, AP, and Wikipedia's "2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis" entry, among other public reporting.

【July 1, 2026 update】US Navy SH-60 makes emergency landing in Arabian Sea, one aviator missing

Per USNI News via Yahoo! News, on July 1, a Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk helicopter assigned to the USS George H. W. Bush made an emergency landing in the Arabian Sea; one of the four crew members was reported missing. US Naval Forces Central Command and the US Fifth Fleet stated that there was no indication that hostile activity had contributed to the incident. The event underscores the intensity of air and naval deployments around the strait and the operational risks that persist.

  • July 1 · US SH-60 emergency landing in Arabian Sea: One aviator missing; the US military said no indication of hostile activity, investigation ongoing.
  • June 27 · JMIC opens widened transit corridor: The US Navy-led Joint Maritime Information Center announced a widened transit corridor off Oman, allowing increased naval escort transits — the most important infrastructure move for the strait's "managed reopening" since the MoU.
  • June 27 · Tanker Kiku hit, US strikes Iran: The oil tanker Kiku was struck in the strait by an Iranian attack drone, damaging its bridge; US Central Command then conducted airstrikes against Iranian military and communications sites near the strait (AP, The Guardian). It was the second day of renewed tensions after the ceasefire.
  • June 25 · Ever Lovely attacked, IMO pauses seafarer evacuation: The Singaporean-flagged container ship Ever Lovely was attacked southeast of Dahit, Oman, forcing the IMO to pause a plan to evacuate 11,000 stranded seafarers (Axios, Tradewinds). Splash247 reported same-day Windward data showing 31 confirmed transits, +48% day-on-day — the first "functional commercial normalcy" signal since the crisis began.
  • June 20 · Iran closes strait again: Following continued Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon after the ceasefire (at least 12 strikes on June 19, Al Jazeera), Iran announced it was closing the strait again, citing Israeli actions as a violation of the agreement (NDTV via Reuters); the US military denied Iran's claim (Reuters, June 20).
  • June 19 · Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire announced: Trump announced an Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire starting Friday, brokered by the US, Qatar, and Iran; the same day, Trump's envoy headed to Switzerland for US-Iran follow-up talks (Reuters).
  • June 17 · Iran-US MoU signing: Trump and Pezeshkian signed the "Islamabad Memorandum," ending the war and lifting blockades on the strait; Iran committed to "instantly" reopen Hormuz, the US to "immediately" lift its naval blockade (The Hindu, TRT World). Oil prices fell about 11% on the day of the announcement.

【June 15, 2026 update】Iran-US peace agreement reached, Strait of Hormuz to reopen

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ghalibaf confirmed early on June 15 that the text of the Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding has been finalized, and the official signing ceremony of the "Islamabad Memorandum" will be held in Switzerland on June 19. From the June 11 military escalation to the June 15 peace agreement took just 4 days — but the "signed-then-closed-again" whipsaw after the June 17 MoU shows execution is harder than signature.

  • Iran confirms MoU text finalized: Ghalibaf stated that the text of the Iran-US MoU has been finalized, with the signing ceremony on June 19 in Switzerland.
  • Maritime blockade ends immediately: Ghalibaf said that from the early hours of June 15, the US maritime blockade of Iran ends, and military operations on fronts including Lebanon will "cease immediately and permanently."
  • Trump: Strait will reopen: Per Xinhua, Trump said on June 14 that with the June 19 signing, the Strait of Hormuz will reopen to facilitate mine-clearing operations.
  • Pakistani PM confirms: Pakistani PM Shahbaz confirmed on June 15 that the US-Iran peace agreement has been reached, with the formal signing on June 19 in Switzerland.
  • Subsequent facts (added in July update):The MoU was signed June 17; the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire was announced June 19; but Iran closed the strait again on June 20 over continued Israeli strikes on Lebanon, the Ever Lovely was attacked June 25, and the Kiku was hit June 27 followed by US strikes on Iran — "signed-then-closed-again" became the dominant pattern for July.

【June 11, 2026 update】Strait of Hormuz officially announced closed

Iran's Armed Forces issued an official notice in the early hours of June 11 local time, declaring the Strait of Hormuz closed to all vessels effective immediately, including tankers and merchant ships; any violator will be targeted. This marked the qualitative shift from "quasi-blockade" (2–6 vessels/day) to "officially announced closure."

  • June 11 early hours · Iran officially announces strait closure: Iran's Armed Forces Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters issued a statement that, given regional instability, the Strait of Hormuz is closed to all vessels effective immediately, including tankers and merchant ships; violators will be targeted.
  • June 11 · Iran strikes US vessels: According to Iranian sources, Iran struck US ships in the Strait of Hormuz that day. Iranian sources also dismissed US claims that vessels are passing through the strait.
  • June 11 early hours · Explosions across southern Iran: According to Iranian sources citing local residents, explosions were heard in southern Iran's Minab and Sirik in the early hours of June 11; around 1:00 AM, explosions were heard in Bandar Abbas; Qeshm Island and Hengam Island were subjected to military strikes and explosions.
  • June 11 · Oil prices jump: WTI crude futures surged, up 3.79% to $93.44/barrel as of 07:00 Beijing time.
  • June 10 · Trump claims US military "secretly" escorted 200+ merchant ships: US President Trump posted on social media that he ordered a secret mission last month for the US military to escort oil tankers and other merchant ships through the Strait of Hormuz, facilitating "over 100 million barrels of oil passing through the strait into open markets and over 200 merchant ships safely passing."
  • June 10 · US discusses fresh strikes: According to US sources, Trump convened a meeting in the White House Situation Room on the afternoon of June 10 to discuss possible new strikes against Iran.
  • June 10 · Israel says operations "far from over": Israeli Defense Minister Katz stated that Israel's military operations against Iran are "far from over" and the IDF is ready to deliver "powerful strikes" against Iran when necessary.
  • June 10 · Iran's UN envoy responds: Threats, intimidation or force cannot achieve sustainable agreements; Trump should stop threatening Iran.

【June 1, 2026 update】Iran suspends US talks, vows Hormuz blockade

On June 1, Iran's negotiating team announced it would suspend dialogue with the US through intermediaries and vowed to "completely block the Strait of Hormuz and activate a new front at Bab el-Mandeb." At the time, the market still harbored some hope that these were "only statements, not yet executed." The June 11 formal announcement and military action substantiated the prior statements.

  • Signal 1 · Talks suspended (June 1): Iran's negotiating team paused dialogue and text exchange with the US via third-party intermediaries. Ceasefire preconditions escalated to "Israel fully withdrawing from occupied Lebanese areas and stopping all attacks in Lebanon and Gaza," plus demanding the US end its naval blockade of the Iranian coastline.
  • Signal 2 · Vow to "completely block" Hormuz (June 1 → executed June 11): Hormuz was already in "quasi-blockade" (only 2–6 vessels/day versus a normal 95–138). On June 11, Iran's Armed Forces officially announced the strait closed and struck US vessels.
  • Signal 3 · Eyeing Bab el-Mandeb, opening a "new front": The "Resistance Front" is seen as able to leverage Yemen's Houthis to pressure Bab el-Mandeb (the southern Red Sea mouth). If the southern Red Sea and Hormuz are obstructed simultaneously, even Saudi crude exported via Yanbu on the Red Sea to "bypass Hormuz" would lose its outlet, squeezing energy and container shipping at once.

Note: Sources include Iranian media, CMG, CNBC, The Researchers, Tasnim and other public reporting.

2. Why the two straits are a "compounding shock" for trade

Many clients ask: "The Red Sea has been on diversion for ages — if Bab el-Mandeb gets worse, how much more does it really affect my boxes?" The key is that stacking the two chokepoints further locks up already-tight diversion capacity:

  • Hormuz (the Persian Gulf gateway): Mainly affects Gulf-country local import/export and energy/tankers, transmitting to global rates through bunker costs and war-risk premiums.
  • Bab el-Mandeb (southern Red Sea): Directly bears on the Asia-Europe and Asia-Mediterranean container mainline (via the Suez Canal). Since the late-2023 Red Sea crisis, mainline carriers have largely diverted around the Cape of Good Hope; after the Houthis declared a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20, southern Red Sea risk moved from "potential" to "actual" — a full Bab el-Mandeb closure would halt Saudi exports via Yanbu and cut global oil supply by a further ~7%, while making transshipment of Red Sea / Jeddah / East Africa cargo more complex.
  • Compounding effect: With both chokepoints under pressure, Cape of Good Hope effective capacity is further absorbed (+10–14 days per voyage), giving carriers more leverage on GRIs (General Rate Increases) and surcharges — and Asia-Europe, Mediterranean, and US lanes all feel it.

Bottom line: For containerized exporters, the core move in late July is not "betting on when the strait reopens," but pricing, scheduling, and insuring against "diversion + dual-chokepoint risk."

3. Latest rates and surcharges (July 17 update)

【July 17 update】Mainlines fall for a second week — while Middle East rates pass their pandemic peak

July pricing shows a clear structural divergence: Transpacific and Asia-Europe mainline spot rates have fallen for two straight weeks as front-loading fades and capacity grows — while Middle East / Persian Gulf rates have surged the other way since the ceasefire collapsed. Per The Loadstar (July 13), Middle East container rates have sailed past their pandemic-era peak. The geopolitical premium is consolidating from "all lanes up" into "concentrated on Middle East and Red Sea-related trades."

Indicator / Lane Latest move (mid-July) Reference
SCFI (Shanghai Containerized Freight Index) 3,080.31 on July 17, down 104.52 (-3.3%) — second straight weekly fall (July 10: 3,184.83, -4.27%, ending a ten-week rally) 3,080.31
Drewry WCI composite -2% in the week of July 16; peak-season upward momentum subsiding USD 4,547/FEU
Shanghai–Los Angeles (USWC) -3%; carriers' July 15 FAK hikes to USD 7,900–8,500 failed to hold; nine Transpacific blank sailings scheduled next week USD 6,272/FEU
Shanghai–New York (USEC) Stable at a relatively high level USD 7,879/FEU
Shanghai–Rotterdam (North Europe) -1%; European port congestion easing (Genoa average waiting time down 33 hours week-on-week) USD 4,873/FEU
Shanghai–Genoa (Mediterranean) -3% USD 6,300/FEU
Middle East / Persian Gulf Rising against the trend since the ceasefire collapse — rates past their pandemic peak (The Loadstar, July 13); war-risk and surcharges climbing in tandem, sharply lifting all-in door costs Confirm per booking
Oil & tankers After Iran's July 14 attacks on shuttle VLCCs, Lloyd's List called crude markets "back to square one"; Goldman revived its $100 oil forecast; MST Marquee: oil could retest $100 if fighting persists for weeks —

Note: Sources — Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI (July 17), Drewry WCI (July 16), The Loadstar, Lloyd's List, CNBC. Also on watch: Drewry flags that US reciprocal tariffs expire July 24 with potential new tariffs in early August — directly affecting August Transpacific volumes and pricing.

Operational takeaway: US and Europe lanes now offer spot negotiating room — work the lane-by-lane playbook in our July 10 SCFI analysis. Middle East and Red Sea-related cargo is the opposite: rates, war-risk, and surcharges are all rising with unstable space and very short quote validity — confirm booking by booking and lock underwriting windows.

Early-June rates and surcharges (historical reference)

Heading into June, east-west rates are climbing on a triple driver: "early peak season + expected July 1 bunker adjustment + Middle East tensions." Carriers landed a fresh round of FAK and surcharges on June 1 — re-price accordingly:

Indicator / Surcharge Latest move (late May – early June) Reference amount
Drewry WCI composite index +3% in the week of May 28, a 4th straight weekly gain, led by Asia-Europe and Transpacific USD 2,800/FEU (40')
Asia-Europe FAK (CMA CGM) New FAK effective June 1 ~ USD 4,700/40'
Asia-Mediterranean FAK (CMA CGM) Effective June 1 USD 5,500–5,700/40'
PSS – Peak Season Surcharge (ONE) Transpacific Eastbound, effective June 1 USD 2,000/FEU
EFS – Emergency Fuel Surcharge (MSC) Asia–US East Coast USD 430→644/FEU; Asia–US West Coast USD 272→467/FEU As shown (adjusted by lane)
WRS – War Risk Surcharge Maintained for Middle East and Persian Gulf; some Gulf cargo +~USD 3,000 per 40' USD 1,500–4,000/box
ECS – Emergency Conflict Surcharge CMA CGM, MSC and others keep charging on Middle East exports (Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, Qatar, Oman, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt Sokhna, Djibouti, etc.) 20': USD 2,000 / 40': USD 3,000 / Reefer & special: USD 4,000
Bunker VLSFO (avg, top 20 hubs) Up ~68% from mid-February (HSFO ~ USD 736.5/t, +66%) USD 856/tonne
Intra-Asia index (IACI) +2%, ~75% above pre-Iran-conflict levels USD 959/40'

Note: Data compiled from Drewry WCI (May 28), Freightos, gCaptain, Lloyd's List, and carrier official notices. Carrier announcements adjust frequently — refer to your booking-time confirmed quote.

Operational takeaway: Because the market broadly expects a July 1 bunker adjustment, demand is being pulled forward into June and space is tightening early. For US and Asia-Europe lanes, lock rates and space early, and plan ahead around the cut-off and blank-sailing windows in the second half of June (around the Dragon Boat holiday).

4. Transit reality and recent incidents

The crisis has persisted for nearly five months since late February. After the June 17 MoU, the strait entered a "bumpy reopening" — per PortWatch data (via Al Jazeera), 513 ships transited in the 18 days from June 18 to July 5, averaging 28 a day, and daily traffic briefly climbed to a post-war high of ~40 in the two weeks before the truce collapsed. But after the July 8 collapse and the July 14 return of the US blockade, transits fell off a cliff. When weighing whether a voyage is feasible, anchor on these hard indicators:

Indicator Pre-crisis level Current level (July 20, 2026)
Daily Hormuz transits ~ 95–140 vessels/day Cliff-edge drop: Lloyd's List Intelligence counted just 53 transits in the week through July 20 (vs 157 the prior week, -66%); S&P Global ~13/day over July 17–19; Kpler shows single digits from July 16; oil flows ~15% of pre-war (MST Marquee)
Stranded mariners — ~6,000 seafarers still stranded in the Gulf (IMO, July 9); Japan pulled out 22 Japan-linked vessels July 7–9, leaving four; Sinokor is offering six months' extra pay to crews willing to sail the strait
War-risk insurance (% of hull) 0.02%–0.05% Raised again after the July 6–7 attacks; some war underwriters advising owners to pause voyages; Marsh: rates "unlikely to come back down" until the market believes the risk environment has genuinely changed
VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) day rate Normal range ~ USD 40k–60k Peak USD 423,736/day in early March; eased after the MoU, then jumped again after the July 14 attacks on shuttle VLCCs — Lloyd's List: crude markets "back to square one"
UKMTO / JMIC cumulative incidents — 59 merchant ships attacked and 17 seafarers killed since the war began (IMO); at least 9 more ships hit July 6–21: Al Rekayyat, Wedyan, Cyprus Prosperity, GFS Galaxy, Stolt Magnesium, Mombasa B, Al Bahyah, Kavomaleas, Kaifan
JMIC risk rating & corridors — Persian Gulf, Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea remain CRITICAL; on July 20 the Kavomaleas was attacked and abandoned inside the US-coordinated southern corridor itself — the escort corridor is now a target, and some owners refuse US-guided transits (Reuters)
IMO coordinated evacuation & corridors — On July 12 the IRGC declared the strait closed a fourth time over "unauthorized routes"; S&P: only ~1/3 of transiting vessels assessed compliant, with Iran-linked and sanctioned ships dominating as mainstream owners stay away

Note: Data compiled from Lloyd's List Intelligence, S&P Global, Kpler, PortWatch, JMIC, UKMTO notices, CNBC, Reuters, Bloomberg, gCaptain, Al Jazeera and other public reporting.

Key events recap (late May – July 21)

  • May 20: Iran coordinated the passage of 26 commercial vessels in a single day — a phase-high since the crisis began, yet still far below the historical 60–140 vessels/day.
  • Late May: The IRGC Navy announced 33 commercial vessels allowed through in a 24-hour window, but actual sailings remained constrained by operators' dual uncertainty over vessels and insurance.
  • June 1: Iran announced the suspension of indirect US talks; the "Resistance Front" vowed to completely block Hormuz and target Bab el-Mandeb.
  • June 10: Trump claimed the US military had "secretly" escorted 200+ merchant ships through Hormuz; convened a White House Situation Room meeting to discuss fresh strikes against Iran. Israeli Defense Minister Katz said operations are "far from over."
  • June 11: Iran's Armed Forces officially announced the Strait of Hormuz closed to all vessels and struck US ships in the strait. Multiple explosions reported in southern Iran. WTI crude rose 3.79% to $93.44/barrel.
  • June 15: Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister confirmed the Iran-US MoU text finalized; signing ceremony on June 19 in Switzerland. US maritime blockade of Iran ends; military operations on all fronts to "cease immediately and permanently." Trump said Hormuz will reopen for mine-clearing.
  • June 17: Trump and President Pezeshkian formally signed the "Islamabad Memorandum," ending the war and lifting blockades on the strait; Iran committed to "instantly" reopen Hormuz, the US to "immediately" lift its naval blockade. Oil prices fell about 11% on the day of the announcement.
  • June 19: Trump announced an Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire starting Friday (brokered by the US, Qatar, and Iran); the same day, Trump's envoy headed to Switzerland for US-Iran follow-up talks. Al Jazeera reported at least 12 Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon on June 19.
  • June 20: Iran announced it was closing the strait again, citing Israeli actions as a violation of the agreement (NDTV via Reuters); the US military denied Iran's claim (Reuters, June 20). The "signed-then-closed-again" whipsaw begins.
  • June 25: The Singaporean-flagged container ship Ever Lovely was attacked southeast of Dahit, Oman, forcing the IMO to pause its plan to evacuate 11,000 stranded seafarers (Axios, Tradewinds). The same day, per Windward data via Splash247, 31 confirmed transits (+48% day-on-day) marked the first "functional commercial normalcy" signal; however, the IRGC Navy same-day rejected the Oman/IMO routing, warning transit without Iran-designated corridors was "unacceptable and extremely dangerous."
  • June 27: The oil tanker Kiku was struck in the strait by an Iranian attack drone, damaging its bridge (confirmed by CENTCOM); US forces then conducted airstrikes against Iranian military and communications sites near the strait (AP, The Guardian). The same day, the US Navy-led JMIC announced a widened transit corridor off Oman, allowing increased naval escort transits.
  • July 1: A US Navy SH-60 Seahawk helicopter assigned to the USS George H. W. Bush made an emergency landing in the Arabian Sea; one aviator was reported missing, with the US military saying there was no indication of hostile activity.
  • July 6–7: The Qatari LNG tanker Al Rekayyat (engine-room fire, crew evacuated), the Saudi supertanker Wedyan, and the Liberian-flagged Cyprus Prosperity were attacked in succession; the US Treasury reimposed oil sanctions on Iran and CENTCOM resumed airstrikes; four oil and gas tankers turned back (Reuters).
  • July 8: The US-Iran interim truce collapsed; Trump said the ceasefire was "over." On July 9, US strikes extended to Tehran for the first time, and Iran fired missiles and drones at multiple Gulf states; Japan evacuated 22 Japan-linked vessels over July 7–9.
  • July 12: The IRGC Navy declared the strait closed a fourth time; the Cyprus-flagged container ship GFS Galaxy was struck and abandoned, with one Indian crew member killed (confirmed July 14); US forces struck Iranian missile batteries, air-defense systems, and IRGC fast-attack boats.
  • July 14: Iran attacked three tankers pre-dawn (Stolt Magnesium, Mombasa B, Al Bahyah) — 1 dead, 8 injured, 3 missing; the US reinstated its naval blockade the same day; Trump scrapped his proposed Hormuz transit fee; the UN condemned the attacks.
  • July 17–19: Transits hit rock bottom: S&P recorded just 40 crossings in 3 days (~13/day); the US Navy disabled a violating vessel a day into the blockade (USNI); on July 17, Iraq and Syria signed an agreement to restore the Kirkuk–Mediterranean oil pipeline.
  • July 20–21: The Dynacom tanker Kavomaleas was attacked and abandoned inside the US-coordinated southern corridor; the KOTC tanker Kaifan was hit the same day; CENTCOM completed a tenth consecutive night of strikes; the Houthis declared a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, escalating Bab el-Mandeb risk; Lloyd's List Intelligence: weekly transits through July 20 down 66%.

5. The insurance market: war-risk is still the "shadow freight rate" — add Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb cover too

【July update】The brief stabilization of mid-to-late June reversed sharply in July: after the July 6–7 attacks, some war-risk underwriters directly advised shipowners to pause Hormuz voyages (Insurance Journal), and rates have ratcheted up week by week with the attack tempo. Marcus Baker, global head of marine at broker Marsh, put it plainly: "Rates have risen again following attacks on shipping by Iran in the region and it is unlikely that they will come back down until the market genuinely believes that the risk environment has changed." After the Houthis declared a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20, war-risk rates and deductibles for the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb legs also need re-quoting. For cargo owners, the core question in late July is not "what's the rate" but whether an underwriting window exists at all, how short the quote validity is, and how to lock pre-sailing rate-increase clauses.

Whether a ship can sail no longer depends only on physical access — it depends on whether the owner can find affordable war-risk cover. The market shows three defining features:

  • Six P&I clubs have withdrawn Persian Gulf-related protection and indemnity cover. New underwriting appetite is concentrated among large European, US, and Asian reinsurers.
  • The US government has rolled out a USD 20 billion reinsurance program, fronted by the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), aiming to use government backstops to rebuild private-insurer confidence so some carriers resume limited transits.
  • Market quotes show rates for owners tied to China, India, or Pakistan typically sit at the upper end. Some stranded Long Range (LR) tankers have been quoted at up to 10% of hull value.

For cargo owners and forwarders: As Bab el-Mandeb risk rises, war-risk premiums and deductibles for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden legs will move up in tandem. For June bookings and policies, spell out the allocation, cap, and trigger conditions of War Risk Insurance / WRS, and confirm deductibles and "pre-sailing rate increase" clauses in advance, so charges can't be added unilaterally after departure. See the scope of cover on our Marine Insurance service page.

6. Carrier round-up (June–July)

  • 【July update】Maersk: Continues to keep Hormuz bookings suspended (Shipping Telegraph, July 14); Hapag-Lloyd called its Q1 result "unsatisfactory" — the war's drag on liner earnings is now showing up in financial reports.
  • 【July update】FAK and capacity control: Carriers' July 15 Transpacific FAK hikes to USD 7,900–8,500/40' failed to hold on softening demand (Drewry); they are pivoting to blank sailings instead — nine scheduled on the Transpacific next week. With US reciprocal tariffs expiring July 24 and possible new tariffs in early August, carriers are waiting on August volume signals.
  • 【July update】Gulf operations: After the ceasefire collapse, mainline carriers re-tightened Persian Gulf calls; S&P data show mainstream international owners barely present among vessels still transiting the strait. Sinokor — the world's largest supertanker owner — is offering six months' extra pay to crews willing to make Hormuz round trips, underlining how hard capacity recovery will be.
  • Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd: All major liners continue to suspend or strictly limit new Hormuz bookings; Asia-Europe Cape diversions are the norm, with FAK/PSS/GRI stacked in June.
  • CMA CGM: New FAK from June 1 — Asia-Europe ~ USD 4,700/40', Asia-Mediterranean USD 5,500–5,700/40'.
  • ONE (Ocean Network Express): PSS of USD 2,000/FEU on Transpacific Eastbound from June 1.
  • MSC: Raised Asia–US East/West Coast EFS (East Coast 430→644, West Coast 272→467 USD/FEU).
  • COSCO Shipping Lines: Maintains port-by-port phased acceptance; Jebel Ali and Abu Dhabi local cargo stays stable, while Iran and high-risk anchorages are still avoided.
  • Escort missions: US Navy escorts remain "symbolic flows," far short of restoring commercial volumes; Europe's Operation Aspides continues to cover certain EU-flagged vessels.

7. Alternative routes and workarounds

7.1 Pipeline and alternate port diversion (for oil and energy cargo — major July developments)

  • 【Signed July 17】Iraq–Syria pipeline restoration deal: The two countries signed an agreement in Washington to rebuild the Kirkuk–Syrian Mediterranean coast pipeline (nameplate 700,000 bpd, closed since 2003). Iraq is among the hardest-hit producers — June output of ~1.9 million bpd is less than half the ~4.2 million bpd of February, before the war (OPEC data via CNBC).
  • UAE: The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline moves crude to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman for loading; a second Fujairah pipeline is under construction that would double export capacity outside the strait (CNBC, July 16).
  • Saudi Arabia: Crude is routed via the East-West Crude Oil Pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea, with a further 2 million bpd expansion under consideration (Reuters, July 7).
  • 【New risk, July 20】Houthi naval blockade on Saudi Arabia: If Bab el-Mandeb fully closes, Yanbu's Red Sea export outlet shuts down with it — halting Saudi crude exports to Asia and cutting global supply by a further ~7%. The value of the "pipeline + Red Sea" workaround is under direct threat. Rapidan Energy adds a caveat: "the problem isn't the waterway" — Iran can strike the pipelines' loading facilities, pumping stations, terminals, and storage; pipelines are a hedge, not an exemption.

7.2 Transshipment and port changes for containerized cargo

  • Intra-Gulf destinations: Prioritize routings via major Indian west-coast hubs (Mundra / Nhava Sheva) with onward truck or feeder to Jebel Ali, Dammam, Bahrain, Doha, and confirm the land-leg pickup agent in advance.
  • Red Sea / Jeddah cargo: Assess feasibility via western Mediterranean hubs (Casablanca, Algeciras) or Port Said in Egypt, watching transshipment-hub congestion and transit times.
  • Asia-Europe and Mediterranean lanes: Mainline carriers continue Cape diversions, adding +10–14 days per voyage, with GRIs and PSS repeatedly applied.

7.3 Multimodal options (China-Europe rail and sea-land) — worth a harder look under dual-chokepoint risk

  • With both chokepoints under pressure and Cape diversion more congested, the "risk-avoidance premium" of China-Europe rail and rail-sea combinations is rising. For Europe-bound time-sensitive cargo, evaluate China-Europe Railway Express (from Qingdao, Lianyungang, Xi'an, etc.) — a transit-time advantage of roughly 15–20 days versus ocean.
  • For Central Asia and Iran land-bound cargo, explore TIR road transport or rail-sea combinations to bypass the Strait risk entirely.
  • Combine with the latest rail and port capacity data in our 2026 multimodal transport corridors article when choosing.

8. The exporter playbook after the ceasefire collapse (July 21 update)

The watch window is closed: all three hard indicators have turned negative

Our July 1 decision framework said: "If transit volume recovers steadily through the first half of July (60+ vessels/day for 2 consecutive weeks) with no new vessel-attack incidents, August–September cargo can re-evaluate diversion necessity on July 15–20." Reviewing that now, all three hard indicators have moved the wrong way:

  • ① Transit volume — collapsed instead of recovering: Just 53 transits in the week through July 20 (-66% week-on-week), ~13/day over July 17–19 (S&P) — far below the 60/day unlock threshold; at least 9 more merchant ships attacked since July 6.
  • ② War-risk — up instead of down: Rates raised again after the July 6–7 attacks, with some underwriters advising owners to pause voyages; Marsh says rates won't fall until the risk environment genuinely changes.
  • ③ Carrier bookings — still avoiding the Gulf: Maersk keeps Hormuz bookings suspended; mainstream international owners are barely present among transiting vessels, which are dominated by Iran-linked and sanctioned ships.

Conclusion: the watch is over. Price and schedule all August–September sailings on "Cape diversion +14 days, full war-risk cover, surcharge caps written into the contract" — and stop treating a strait recovery as the base case.

Six action items (July 21 updated version)

  1. Price everything on diversion: Plan all August–September sailings on diversion +14 days; evaluate direct Persian Gulf calls booking by booking, and only where the carrier confirms acceptance and war-risk cover is actually obtainable — no bulk commitments.
  2. Middle East / Red Sea cargo — lock underwriting windows per booking: Middle East rates have passed their pandemic peak and quote validity is extremely short, so book and insure in the same motion; nail down war-risk allocation, rate caps, and pre-sailing-increase clauses. After the July 20 Houthi blockade declaration against Saudi Arabia, re-quote war-risk and deductibles for Red Sea, Jeddah, and Gulf of Aden legs — see our Marine Insurance service.
  3. Use the mainline pullback: US and Europe spot rates have fallen two straight weeks (SCFI 3,080; WCI USD 4,547) — lock August space and budgets into the dip. But note US reciprocal tariffs expire July 24 with possible new tariffs in early August: a fresh front-loading rush could cut the window short, and nine Transpacific blank sailings may re-tighten selected weeks.
  4. Upgrade contract clauses: For WRS, PSS, GRI, ECS, and EFS, specify who pays, the cap, and the notice window; add "geopolitical force majeure" and "rate-adjustment-on-closure/blockade" clauses to new and renewed contracts; document the July 8 truce collapse, July 12 fourth closure, July 14 US blockade reinstatement, and July 20 Houthi blockade declaration in writing as evidence for price adjustments and delay claims.
  5. Promote backups to primary routings: For intra-Gulf destinations, make Indian west-coast transshipment (Mundra / Nhava Sheva) the primary plan rather than the backup; lift China-Europe rail share to 15%–20% for Europe-bound cargo; energy and bulk clients should track the Iraq–Syria pipeline and the UAE's second Fujairah pipeline for medium-term logistics planning.
  6. Buyer notification and evidence documentation: Notify buyers in writing of every delay, port change, contract amendment, or surcharge adjustment, and archive everything; citing authoritative statistics such as the IMO's "59 ships attacked, 17 seafarers killed" helps buyers accept the objectivity of force majeure and cost pass-through.

9. August scenarios (July 21 update): three paths after the ceasefire collapse

Of our July 1 scenarios, "Scenario B · implementation collapses, strait closes again" became reality over July 8–14: truce collapse, a fourth closure, the return of the US blockade, and ten consecutive nights of strikes. AP wrote on July 18 that the US and Iran have "blown past red lines" and are lurching back toward all-out war. From the July 21 position, we re-project three scenarios for August:

  • Scenario A · High-intensity stalemate (baseline, most likely): Vessel attacks and airstrikes become routine without tipping into full-scale war; strait transits oscillate at 15%–25% of pre-war levels in "ebbs and flows" (Lloyd's List Intelligence: owners seize brief windows of perceived safety, then pull back); Middle East rates and war-risk stay elevated while mainline rates trade on peak-season volumes and capacity management. Response: keep the "diversion + full war-risk" baseline; lock August mainline space into the pullback; run Middle East cargo booking by booking.
  • Scenario B · Further escalation, both chokepoints obstructed (medium-high risk): US-Iran strikes expand systematically to infrastructure and ports; the Houthis enforce their declared blockade on Saudi Arabia and Bab el-Mandeb effectively closes — Saudi Red Sea exports halt, global oil supply drops a further ~7%, oil retests $100 (Goldman, MST Marquee), Cape capacity tightens further and rates plus bunker surcharges rise across the board. Response: reroute or pause Red Sea/Jeddah cargo early; lift China-Europe rail share to 20%–30%; energy-linked clients lock term contracts and hedges; re-examine force-majeure clauses on all Middle East exposure.
  • Scenario C · Renewed mediation and ceasefire (low-to-medium probability): Trump said on July 15 that Iran "wants to meet." If a new truce lands in August, June's experience suggests recovery only returns transits to the ~30–40/day "bumpy reopening" level at best, with war-risk and carrier-policy repair still needing a 2–3 month observation period — and after two rounds of "signed-then-broken," market trust rebuilds even slower. Response: even if a ceasefire is announced, keep August pricing on diversion; treat it only as a leading signal for gradual September–October loosening.

Key windows to watch around August

  • July 24 · US reciprocal tariffs expire: Drewry flags potential new tariffs in early August — a fresh front-loading rush would abruptly end the Transpacific rate pullback; lock August space early.
  • Iran's "60-day transition" deadline: Iran has said it will charge transit fees once the transition period ends (Al Jazeera); the US has scrapped its own fee plan, but the US-Iran standoff over "who charges whom" will directly shape August–September transit costs and compliance risk (the US Treasury has warned it would "aggressively" sanction any party facilitating an Iranian toll system).
  • Bab el-Mandeb · enforcement of the Houthi blockade: After the July 20 declaration, verify day by day whether Saudi-linked ships are actually attacked — the decisive variable for Red Sea routings and the Yanbu diversion plan.
  • Q3 quarter-end (before September 30): For all Q3-expiring L/Cs, receivables reconciliation, and stranded/in-transit cargo bookkeeping, plan backwards from "diversion transit times + possible second-round delays" and complete system bookkeeping and negotiation-period assessment by September 15.

10. Recovery timeline (July 21 update): the ceasefire collapse resets every clock

When the MoU was signed on June 17, the market debate was "how long will demining take, when do war-risk rates fall." Since the July 8 collapse, even "when is the next ceasefire" is unknown. And whenever a new truce arrives, recovery still requires healing across ports, insurance, and ship supply — with two rounds of "signed-then-broken" having drained market trust:

  • Clearing sea mines could take 4–6 months — and demining presupposes a ceasefire. On July 14 the IRGC justified its attacks by claiming ships had entered a "mined route": the mine threat not only persists, it is being used as a targeting rationale.
  • The war-risk reset period has been stretched by the double whipsaw. Underwriters typically require months of sustained stability before resetting rates; June's brief easing was wiped out by July's attacks, and Marsh says rates won't fall until the market genuinely believes the risk environment has changed — with some underwriters currently advising owners to pause voyages altogether.
  • Carrier booking policies will heal slowest. Maersk keeps Hormuz bookings suspended; S&P shows mainstream international owners largely absent from the strait, which Iran-linked and sanctioned tonnage dominates. Even after a ceasefire, carriers will need to re-verify corridor safety and insurance availability before phasing bookings back.
  • Seafarer supply is a hard constraint. Around 6,000 seafarers remain stranded in the Gulf (IMO); 17 have been killed since the war began; owners are paying six months' extra wages to crew willing to sail the strait — even with routes reopened, crew willingness and rotation capacity will cap the pace of recovery.
  • The "escorted corridor" myth is broken. On July 20 the Kavomaleas was attacked and abandoned inside the US-coordinated southern corridor; Vortexa notes Iran is now specifically targeting ships on the Omani route; some owners refuse US-guided transits. The gap between "corridor on paper" and "actual safety" is wider than in June.

Bottom line: Lloyd's List editor Richard Meade previously estimated that even with an immediate reopening, tanker and oil markets would not normalize until at least September — a view premised on June's "bumpy reopening." After July's collapse, that timeline shifts wholesale to the right. Lloyd's List Intelligence now expects transits to move in "ebbs and flows" with owner risk appetite rather than recover linearly. Exporters should schedule and price on "the strait stays low and volatile through H2."

11. How Mighty International can help (July 21 update)

As a Qingdao-based international freight forwarder with 26 years of experience, Mighty International can support export clients in the new circumstances following July's ceasefire collapse, the fourth strait closure, and the return of the US blockade:

  • Real-time tracking and strategy adjustments: Monitor strait transit volumes (Lloyd's List Intelligence / S&P / Kpler), UKMTO attack advisories, war-risk rate changes, carrier booking policies, and the enforcement of the Houthi blockade on Saudi Arabia, providing clients with first-time strategy adjustment recommendations (diversion necessity, war-risk configuration, rate adjustments).
  • Space coordination and rate locking: Multi-carrier pricing and space locking for Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Asia-Europe, and Mediterranean lanes; tracking carriers' latest suspension, port change, and rate/surcharge adjustment notices; assisting clients in locking rates or adjusting prices at optimal timing.
  • Port change, contract amendment, and alternative routing: Design and execute Indian West-coast hub, North Africa/South Europe hub, Gulf of Oman/Red Sea port diversion plans; assist with port change, contract amendment, and vessel rollover procedures; assess direct route restoration feasibility and timing after the JMIC corridor opened.
  • Dynamic war-risk coordination: Coordinate quotes from multiple underwriters; assist clients in tracking war-risk rate trend changes; complete war-risk, strike insurance, and detention insurance configuration adjustments during rate-decline windows; assist in interpreting deductibles and rate-cap clauses.
  • Customs declaration, inspection, and documentation support: Provide pre-cut-off planning, L/C amendment assistance, and expedited certificate of origin processing for the Q3 quarter-end.
  • China-Europe rail and multimodal backup plans: Based on your cargo attributes and time requirements, provide comparable ocean/China-Europe rail/air options and risk-avoidance ratio recommendations to help diversify transportation risks.

12. Sources

Disclaimer: This article is for industry reference only and does not constitute a binding service commitment. Geopolitics, rates, routings, insurance, and surcharges are adjusted dynamically by all parties based on real-time safety assessments. Please refer to your actual booking and insurance quote and agreement. Last updated: July 21, 2026.

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FOB / CIF / CFR / DDP Incoterms Complete Guide

Under the Hormuz crisis, who bears the cost of diversions, added insurance, and port changes — buyer or seller? The answer lies in the "risk and cost boundary" defined by Incoterms. Clarify before signing to avoid financial disputes later.

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